Histories of smallpox and vaccination are both varied and voluminous. In purely epidemiological terms, smallpox has acquired for itself a position of significance far in excess of its numerical importance as a cause of death in the nineteenth century.1 Although mortality from the disease had already declined from high levels in the eighteenth century, smallpox vaccination has recently been credited for a large part of the total mortality decline in England and Wales during the second half of the nineteenth century.2 While vaccination was undoubtedly the prime facilitator for the eradication of smallpox, recent research has shown that the regional pattern of public infant vaccination take-up rates varied enormously across the country and over time, and that revaccination at puberty was not universal.3 In wider terms, vaccination also addresses important historical debates, including the state provision of free, universal (though compulsory) health care.4 It helps illustrate the success of local preventive medical services;5 and it draws attention to ideological objections to governmental interference with individual liberty-in this respect smallpox and vaccination have prompted comparison with the present-day AIDS
government had been centralized. Writing in 1886, the Medical Officer of Health (MOH) for Brighton reflected that "we in the provinces naturally look to London to take the lead in all matters belonging to sanitation or in connection with the sanitary service ... When the local government of London is placed on a uniform basis or plan, and thoroughly reorganized, from the example of London we shall look for great things in the extension of the science and practice of sanitation".10 According to Edwin Chadwick-an arch centralizer-London's disunity of government, "retarded improvement, diminished efficiency, and increased cost in every branch of local services", I and the Sanitary Record described the capital's system of local government as "a tissue of the most flagrant anomalies and the most rampant red tape".12 The problem was twofold. First, there was a bewildering multiplicity of governing bodies. Second, the sanitary law in London remained unconsolidated, largely because the notion of such a merger aroused strong opposition among the independent sanitary authorities in the capital. A combination of the fragmentary executive and equally fragmentary legislation resulted in disjointed sanitary management.
London was exempted from the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, a squandered opportunity that Robson has claimed was "a revolution missed ... from this calamity the metropolis has never recovered".13 The executive management of public health administration, and the legislation which empowered the executive bodies, therefore evolved in a piecemeal manner. Under the Metropolis Local Management Act of 1855,14 the local sanitary government of London was controlled by 23 parish vestries and 15 combinations of parishes called district boards. The City of London, governed by the City Corporation which comprised 206 annually elected Common Council Members and 26 Aldermen elected for life, maintained its ancient privileges. Through its Commission of Sewers, the Corporation carried out virtually the same public health functions as the vestries and district boards. From 1867, hospital provision and admissions of pauper cases of infectious disease-commonly typhus, typhoid, scarlet fever and smallpox-were administered by the Metropolitan Asylums Board (MAB).15 Until the creation of the London County Council (LCC) in 1888, further powers for the enforcement of sanitary control were vested in the Metropolitan Board of Works (MBW), which was responsible for, among other things, the main drainage of the capital.'6 Significantly in the context of this paper, control of vaccination administration rested with the local Poor Law Boards of Guardians. It is hardly surprising that little coherent policy was forthcoming from such a varied palimpsest of local bureaucracies. The parochial authorities in particular suffered 10 R P B Taaffe, ' criticism for their obduracy in sanitary matters, even from their employees, the MOHs. In 1860 Edwin Lankester, the MOH for St James Westminster, was scathing in his condemnation of the vestries and district boards: "it has been the usual course of action in England to give the power of superintending the sanitary welfare of the population to the local authorities in the towns and parishes, but the remark applies very generally to these bodies, that they are acquainted with the value of almost everything better than the value of human life".17 When local sanitary authorities should have been first past the post in devising and implementing housing regulations, supplying gas and water, and providing drainage and lighting services, William Farr at the GRO argued that the Corporation of London and the "half trusted vestries" deserted their responsibilities and the "field was left open to capitalists". He mused:
If the whole of the people amounting in 1871 to 3,885,641 on a circle with a radius of 15 miles can be administered for police purposes from Scotland Yard, can they not be associated together in one community for the purpose of local government, and with the City for the central point of administration? A city is a Co-operative Society for the supply of the common wants.18
During the nineteenth century and up to the present day, wide debate has centred around the conflict between central and local government.19 Although the majority of research has concentrated upon the relationship between London and the provinces, London itself has also been difficult to ignore as an arena for the study of central-local relations.20 Yet the role of sanitary management in these debates has been somewhat marginalized against the need to provide a much wider assessment of a unified political administration of the capital.2' In the 1870s, Farr argued that sanitary government in the capital should have been placed "under the supreme control of one Municipality, with a great administrator at its head".22 Such a sweeping solution to London's problems may be considered startlingly simple yet radical; so radical, in fact, that eight legislative attempts to revamp London's governmental structure between 1860 and 1884 failed. Most of them encountered opposition because they proposed completely to supersede the vestries and the City Corporation with a unified authority.23 From the public health perspective, a compromise arrangement was frequently aired in the pages of the Sanitary Record during the early-to mid-1880s. It appears that the metropolitan MOHs generally favoured retaining the vestries in an executive capacity, but under the guiding control of a central authority. Such an authority would take over the work of the MBW; be responsible for hospital provision; have power to acquire the property of the water companies on equitable terms; and appoint coroners and registrars of births, deaths and marriages. Further, in wresting control of hospital provision and admission as well as smallpox vaccination from the MAB and Poor Law Guardians, it was hoped that the "pauperizing" nature and wary public perception of this association would be removed. It had long been contended that connection with the Poor Law Board in vaccination matters was both unwanted and inefficient,24 and that the responsibility for vaccination should be placed in the hands of the MOHs, who would be better placed to use vaccination as "one of the most useful weapons for the defence of the public health".25 This dissociation would potentially accrue wider public benefits in that no distinction would be made between paupers suffering from infectious disease and other members of the population who could not be properly treated in their homes. In other words, the preventive medical profession recognized the value of non-means-tested accessibility to health care, since "danger to the community is the same, be the patient who he may".26 The creation of a public health department, with a principal medical officer at its head, would have been a pre-requisite of the new authority. The department would effectively monitor and control the spread of disease through a network of local MOHs, the appointment of which would at least be confirmed, if not made, by the central authority. These MOHs would be responsible for making daily and periodic returns of sickness and mortality to the centre. It was suggested that some members of this central body could be elected by the vestries but that others would be elected directly by the ratepayers. This plan, it was hoped, would simultaneously ensure that the vestries would "be weeded of traders in insanitary property" and bring "irresponsible bodies to a condition of supervision".27 Further, the bitter pill of creeping centralization could be sweetened for the vestries by the promise of their retaining a degree of power and control over their local areas. But, perhaps most significantly from the medical viewpoint, with the centralization not only of administration, but also of knowledge, the plan would have given unbridled power to the MOHs as gatekeepers to the continuum of prevention, treatment, care and cure in London. The following sections of the paper show how this argument, which embraced the rationalization of vaccination and other public health services, developed and why it was not incorporated into the mainstream calls for the centralization of all sanitary services.
Smallpox Mortality and the Structure of Vaccination Administration in Mid-Nineteenth-Century London Figure 1 shows the smallpox mortality rates for England and Wales and London, as well as London's share of the national total of smallpox deaths. Figure 1 also shows that London's share of national smallpox deaths rose above 70 per cent in the period 1878-81, although it must be remembered that the number of deaths nationally in these four years was low compared to epidemic years (978, 283, 339 and 1,673 smallpox deaths respectively). Figure 2 illustrates that children, and infants in particular, were especially vulnerable to the ravages of smallpox, most notably during periods of high overall mortality from the disease.31
Infant smallpox mortality rates in 1871 reached 1,006 per 100,000 live births, compared to a total smallpox mortality rate of 224 per 100,000 population. In 1881 Shirley Murphy, MOH for St Pancras, outlined the manifold reasons for London's high levels of smallpox mortality in the 1870s and 1880s: the migratory character of the population, with newly arrived inhabitants from rural areas and abroad being unvaccinated;32 the large number of infants born in institutions escaping vaccination; the laxity of re-vaccination; and the difficulty of supplying lymph to the capital, especially during epidemics.33 To these, we may add the inefficient performance of the vaccination operation itself, which had already been identified as a contributory influence; and the continuing "pauperizing" nature of public vaccination provided under the auspices of the Poor Law Board.34 It is the main contention of this paper that periods of epidemic smallpox, severe in the metropolis compared to the rest of the nation, were not only caused by the factors outlined above, but were also mediated through the uniquely inadequate operational administration of the vaccination laws in London. It has already been pointed out that, unlike many other public health responsibilities, vaccination fell outside the jurisdiction of the vestries and district boards. The Vaccination Acts of the early 1840s originally entrusted the service to the Poor Law Guardians, since they "were example, London's population at risk in 1855 is the mean of the London populations given in the 1851 and 1861 censuses. The figures for London's share of national smallpox deaths for the period are given in A Hardy, 'Smallpox in London: factors in the decline of the disease in the nineteenth century', Med. Hist., 1983, 27: 111-38, p. 121. 29 Vaccination Act 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 100) . 30 The epidemic in England actually began towards the end of 1870 and lasted until the early months of 1873. In London, the deaths were heavily concentrated in 1871 (7,982 deaths) rather than 1872 (1,747 deaths). 31 The population at risk for the 1-4 year olds in Figure 2 is calculated in exactly the same way as described in note 28 above. However, two points of clarification should be made. First, the age structure in single year age groups for the under-fives was not given in the 1851 census. For the years 1851-60, then, the 1861 structure was used for the population at risk in these ages. Second, the number of live births in an individual year was used as the population at risk for infants. 1861-62.43 As in all other localities across the nation, the operation of public vaccination in London depended upon a triangular framework of responsibility involving the local Boards of Guardians, the public vaccinators and parents. Seaton and Buchanan suggested that the uniquely inadequate functioning of this triumvirate in London was the main cause of the capital's low vaccination rates, and the following paragraphs detail the inspectors'
claims.4
Boards of Guardians
Under the provisions of vaccination legislation, the duties of the Guardians were threefold. First, they were obliged to appoint both the public vaccinators and their stations and set the regulations pertaining to the attendance of the vaccinators; second, they were supposed to issue public notifications of vaccination; and finally they were empowered to institute proceedings for the enforcement of vaccination. Obviously, then, the local Guardians had strong, independent control over the arrangements for public vaccination.
The mere association of vaccination with the pauper authorities was a severe handicap to the system; it was often logical for the Notification of the arrangements was required to be published by the Guardians. Yet it was only during epidemic periods that this particular rule was observed, and the practice of informing the public was not universal. The notices were often not comprehensive and were frequently superseded by new arrangements, thus conflicting with the instructions given to parents by the registrar of births. In non-epidemic times, only 16 of the 39 parishes managed to notify the public and 8 of the 16 provided simple placards issued on an irregular basis (perhaps every one or two years). Nevertheless, such arrangements as billed were frequently overridden by new ones, or the vaccinators made new arrangements themselves and these were not always publicized. Some placards merely informed parents of the vaccination laws, but neglected to give information appertaining to the vaccination 45 arrangements in that district. Certainly there was ample scope for confusion. In St Luke Chelsea, one contractor's schedule arranged for attendance on Tuesdays and Fridays between 9 and 10 o'clock; yet the placard issued by the Guardians announced that he would attend daily at 9 am; the registrar of births and deaths advertised that he attended on Thursday at half past nine; while the inspectors found he vaccinated chiefly on Mondays and also in his private surgery every morning from 9 to 10!48
In view of such farcical arrangements-and St Luke's does not appear to have been unique-it seems ironic that it should fall to the Guardians to appoint an officer with the remit of prosecuting defaulting parents.49 In view of their overall unwillingness and inability to provide an efficient service, it is perhaps not surprising that the Guardians in only 10 of the 39 unions had elected to do this by 1863, especially since such prosecutions were not funded from the rates. The prosecuting officer, when appointed, generally came from a variety of "public service" backgrounds, the officership being additional to their existing duties. Either the assistant Poor Law overseer or the relieving officer, the sanitary inspector, the MOH, the registrar, or the public vaccinator himself, served in this capacity. Only nine London unions had served warnings to defaulters on a regular basis and this was normally found to be sufficient action. Where proceedings had been instigated, the case collapsed in four unions due to the absence of a registered birth. Of all the authorities, only Paddington and Poplar had pursued prosecutions to the point of imposing a fine. Whilst agreeing in principle, in practice the Guardians were reluctant to prosecute under any circumstances in order to avoid creating an atmosphere of ill-will amongst the local population and, perhaps more significantly, their ratepaying electors.50
Public Vaccinators
The vaccinators' contractual regulations required them to attend for vaccination at appointed times in person or by legal deputies; perform vaccination according to the instructions; inspect the results of these vaccinations; keep a register; and give certificates to parents and registrars verifying successful vaccination.51 Although the vaccinators were theoretically under the scrutiny of the Guardians, Seaton and Buchanan alleged that gross imperfections were to be found in the practice of all these duties. The majority of the vaccinators employed in London (132 of As noted, a number of the deputies were involved in the inspection of the results of vaccination and this was reasonably well carried out. Most of the children were returned to the vaccinating station for inspection one week after the performance of the operation. Yet the general consensus of the vaccinators was that the quality of between one-quarter and two-thirds of all vaccinated cases remained unconfirmed. In some cases, the mere hearsay of the parents or neighbours was considered to be sufficient verification, whilst some vaccinators assumed success if the child was not brought back. A number of these unsuccessful cases were not even entered in the vaccination registers, and in only 6 of the 205 registers the inspectors examined were the records considered to be of satisfactory quality.53 The Guardians themselves rarely scrutinized the quality of the registers in detail, although abstracts were frequently presented at weekly or fortnightly Board meetings. This is an especially important point. First, since the registers determined payment of the account, imperfect registers resulted in inaccurate payments. Second, the information contained in the registers was compiled for the annual returns to the Poor Law Board, upon which contemporary opinion about the extent and quality of vaccination was based. Yet the inspectors "found in nearly half the unions errors of some magnitude, and that the return was in some cases altogether unreliable".54
The vaccinators were required to provide parents with a certificate of successful vaccination and over 70 per cent of the 191 vaccinators in London who were asked asserted that they performed this duty in all cases. The remainder issued the certificates either irregularly or not at all. Far more problematic was the sending of a duplicate certificate to the registrar, who was supposed to keep a record of the successful vaccinations. Although 189 of the vaccinators alleged that they did so, Seaton and Buchanan suggested, "it is certain that some of these must have spoken rather of a recently adopted or of an intended practice than of a habit steadily pursued, as the statements were not always reconcilable with the entries in the books of the registrars".55 Indeed, it was discovered that only ten registrars had recorded the vaccination of over 50 per cent of the births in their sub-district. The system of duplicate certificates was doubtless cumbersome, but in at least six unions the Guardians required evidence of the delivery of the certificate in order to ensure payment for the vaccination.
Parents
The steps parents took for having (or refusing to have) their newly born infant vaccinated were conditioned not only by the legislation, but also by socio-cultural beliefs 52 Ibid., p. 100. Stepney The Quantity and Quality of Vaccination Seaton and Buchanan's suggestions for solving this problem and how these relate to the centralization issue will be discussed later. The concern here is the extent to which the location and provision of vaccination stations influenced the quality and quantity of vaccination. The number of stations in a union was not a particularly influential factor in determining the extent of vaccination, despite the fact that London was well provided with them.67 Paradoxically, the large number of stations (260) was probably detrimental to the quality of vaccination. Over the two years 1861-62, 46,067 vaccinations were performed in the capital, producing an average attendance of less than one child at each station on each vaccinating day, a problem exacerbated by the practice of vaccinating children in their own homes. The Privy Council recommended an average attendance of at least 10 children per vaccinating day, thus enabling the opportunity to vaccinate directly from the arms of other children. Based upon this, an annual average attendance of 500 for a vaccinating station was considered to be a primary test of the efficient working of that station. Table 2 serves to show that the administrative sub-division of London meant that a very small number of the vaccinators managed to achieve this optimum figure. It was those stations with between 200 and 500 vaccinations per year which managed successfully to maintain arm-to-arm vaccinations. Yet such a record could be kept up only through the particular diligence of the vaccinator, strict adherence to the advertised vaccinating time, and the provision of ample space for the reception of children, which facilitated arm-to-arm vaccination.68 Table 2 The average number of vaccinations occurring in London's public vaccination stations, 1861-62 being the first date for which the total number of infant vaccinations is available.74 It appears that almost one third of all infant vaccinations in England and Wales were performed privately. In London, although the level of public vaccination gradually increased as the 1871 Act took hold, the proportion of private vaccinations was much higher, consistently accounting for about 400 infant vaccinations per 1,000 live births. Why this should be the case is unclear. Certainly, the evidence provided in this paper suggests that Londoners' perception and usage of the public vaccination system would probably have been undermined by the inadequate working of it by the authorities. Further, it was known that many wealthy parents preferred to pay for a private vaccination rather than avail their children of the gratuitous facilities on offer at the public stations.75 It may well be that the concentration of such families in certain parts of London served not only to lower the percentage of public infant vaccinations in these districts, but was also significant enough to reduce the level in the metropolis overall. Whether these assumptions apply to the time before the 1867 and 1871 Vaccination Acts must remain a moot point-certainly the public IVRs presented earlier in Table 3 should take into account the possibly weighty contribution made by private vaccinations to the prevention of smallpox in some London districts.
The issue of vaccination quantity becomes almost inconsequential should that vaccination be performed improperly on a wide scale. An evaluation of quality cannot be conducted without reference to the method of the operation itself, especially since vaccination does not confer life-long immunity. There were a number of methods of inserting lymph into the arm, but puncture was the mode recommended by the Privy Council. Four or five separate punctures were the optimum in order to produce four or five vesicles, which by the eighth day should have had a distended appearance containing clear lymph.76 The success of the operation also depended upon the quality of the lymph available. In this period, it was believed that the best lymph was obtained fresh from the arm of a recently vaccinated child around about this eighth day.77 Inspection of the results in the station also afforded the opportunity to perform arm-to-arm vaccinations on unvaccinated children. In the absence of recently vaccinated children, however, vaccinators used preserved lymph on ivory points or in capillary tubes, either maintained by themselves or provided by the National Vaccine Establishment in emergencies. Seaton and Buchanan discovered that of the 229 vaccinators they assessed, 157 of them operated by puncture. Twenty-five per cent of the 157 made three marks or less, which was at least one fewer than the number recommended by the Privy Council. It 77 The danger of secondary infection from arm-toHowever, the overwhelming majority of infant arm vaccination was only recognized by legislation vaccinations, if not all of them, were primary, so this in 1898, when it was prohibited and glycinerated should not unduly affect the figures.
calf-lymph was used. 75 G Buchanan, Supplement to the 11th annual constancy, even when fresh lymph was used, the 'good sized vesicles' which the instructions require".78 Seventy-two vaccinators operated by abrasion, scratch or superficial cuts. A total of 44 of this group produced less than three spots on the arm by this method, although in some cases this was adequate to produce the desired result.
To further assess vaccination quality Seaton and Buchanan examined the vaccination marks on the arms of almost 50,000 children in a collection of schools, industrial establishments and workhouses across London. Only 8,901 children in the sample (18 per cent) were vaccinated to the standard of four well-sized marks (cicatrices) as directed by the Privy Council and just over one third of the vaccinated children (17,597) had three "good" scars. It is very difficult to be confident about discussing spatial differences in the quality of vaccination because a greater proportion of children examined in some districts came from the "ragged" and industrial schools where more unvaccinated children were to be found.79 Nevertheless, the extensive inquiry concluded that the overall quality of public vaccination across the whole of London in the early 1860s was poor.
Once again, the official records of this period are comparatively silent about the efficiency of private vaccinators. An investigation by Henry Stevens of the vaccination history of each of the 2,379 smallpox deaths in London in 1881, however, makes it appear highly unlikely that private vaccination was in any way superior to that provided publicly. Of the 125 smallpox deaths to allegedly vaccinated children under 10 years of age, only 35 were publicly vaccinated as opposed to 82 privately (after detailed inquiry, it was discovered that the remaining eight children had not in fact been vaccinated).80 Although he was prepared to concede that some private vaccination was undoubtedly of the standard required, George Buchanan maintained that these results underlined the inadequacy of much private vaccination, the superficiality of which was actually adopted as a sellingpoint by its exponents:
It ... offers itself in competition with public vaccination, and parades its inefficiency as a reason for its acceptance by ignorant people. Its professors say to young mothers, "Do you come to me, and I won't hurt your baby; I'll make only one place on its arm, not four, as those public vaccinators do".81
The following section demonstrates that although the problem of securing efficient public and private vaccination provided a convincing case for the centralization of London's sanitary administration, the link of public vaccination with the Poor Law, together with the political leverage wielded by the vestries and district boards, ensured that the argument remained ineffectual. 78 what they felt would be an ideal set of conditions. Vaccination should be at stated times, taken direct from the arms of other children with the best type of lymph. The operation should be performed by the appointed vaccinator, or a legal deputy. Successful vaccination should be ensured by proper inspection, and adequate accommodation be provided for the patients. Finally, the stations should be within a reasonable distance for parents to take their children. Although they simply appeared to be condoning the standardization across London of what they considered the best vaccinating practices, it was argued that some of these conditions could be met only through a radical rationalization in the number of vaccination stations across the metropolis. In excess of the Privy Council's recommendations, it was suggested that the best form of arm vaccination could only be fully performed with an average of one thousand annual cases. Two such stations operated successfully in Manchester and Birmingham, and it was estimated that in the latter there was only one unsuccessful operation in a total of 1,205 during 1863.84 This plan involved the maintenance of about fifty or sixty stations in London. If these stations were located as shown in Figure 3 , the inspectors argued that, on average, no house would be more than a quarter of a mile from a station.
With this apparently common-sense plan, based upon the concept that parents had the right of free access to a nearby vaccination station of their choosing, the inspectors proposed to abolish the inconvenience that parochial boundaries imposed upon the smooth operation of vaccination in the capital. Because no central authority existed in London for co-ordinating the actions of 39 unions, or to which their responsibilities could be transferred, a committee on the Metropolitan Board of Works or a special Vaccination Board to deal exclusively with metropolitan vaccination was proposed. Such a body would have the following eight duties: 1. The fixing of the vaccination station location, under the conditions outlined above. 2. The appointment of the vaccinators, who would be restricted in number. 3. Assuring the attendance and performance of the vaccinators. The most important aspect was that this agency would be both dissociated from the stigma of parochial relief and independent of minor local influence and interests. We should not be surprised at this outcome to the report, which presented a powerful case for the central control of vaccination administration in the metropolis. In the event, there was a parochial rationalization, undertaken in 1868 by the Poor Law Board, which reduced the number of unions in the capital from 39 to 30 and the number of public vaccinators to 134. By the time a Parliamentary review of the 1867 Vaccination Act was conducted, Seaton argued that "a very great deal of London is now very much upon the principle which we proposed".86 Although evidence that the proportion of smallpox mortality occurring in the 1-4 age group was declining seems to bear out Seaton's claim that the Act had been successful,87 Table 5 illustrates that a number of districts in London suffered very high levels of smallpox mortality in 1871. These particular mortality rates hold two significant advantages over and above the mortality data published for registration districts in the ARRGs.88 First, they are the only annual rates available for the component districts of the metropolis broken down in any way by age-although a very limited number of MOH annual Reports gave such data and the Registrar-General's decennial Supplements do provide ten-year totals by district.89 Second, the smallpox deaths occurring in the several metropolitan asylum fever hospitals and the smallpox hospitals were redistributed back to the original district of residence of the deceased.90 The historical importance of these rates should not therefore be underestimated. We can see that the impact of the 1871 epidemic on the under-fives was especially severe in St George Hanover Square in west London, Shoreditch and Bethnal Green in the east end, and Wandsworth and St Saviour Southwark south of the river Thames. The mortality rates in some of these districts were more than ten times the national rate and the fact that the amount of public vaccination had not increased since the 86 Reportfrom the Select Committee on the Vaccination Act 1867, PP 1871, xiii, p. 306. Lambert notes that criticism of this policy was forthcoming from the Lancet, the PLMOs and William Farr. See Lambert, op. cit., note 42 above, p. 445.
87 The proportion of total national smallpox mortality occurring in the under-five age group fell from 55 per cent in 1867, to 34 per cent in 1870 and 30 per cent in 1872. Seaton also claimed that of the metropolitan districts in 1871-72, only in Bethnal Green did this proportion "remain at the average of the period preceding the Act of 1867". In all the others, the proportion was below. This probably refers to the ten years 1851-60, since the only mortality data giving under-five mortality by district appears in the Registrar-General's decennial Supplements. See Mooney, op. cit., note 67 above, . The greater proportion of adults dying from smallpox was often used as an argument for the value of revaccination at puberty.
88 Mention should be made of the method used to calculate the mortality rates shown in Table 5 .
Smallpox deaths in E C Seaton, 'On the recent epidemic of smallpox in the United Kingdom, and its relation to vaccination and the vaccination laws', Report of the Medical Officer of the Privy Council and Local Government Board, 1874 (henceforth RMOPCLGB), PP 1875, xl, Appendix 5, are given for the under-five age group and all ages. For the under-fives, the population at risk used for each registration district, London and England and Wales, is that given in the 1871 census. However, because some babies born in 1871 will have died before the census enumeration, the under-one age group is subtracted and replaced with the total number of live births in that year, taken from the 34th ARRG, 1871, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 32.
89 See B Luckin and G Mooney, 'Urban history and historical epidemiology: the case of London, 1860 -1920 ', Urban Hist., 1997 90 On London's "redistribution" problem, see N Williams and G Mooney, 'Infant mortality in an "Age of Great Cities": London and the English provincial cities compared ', Continuity and Change, 1994, 9:185-212, pp. 188-90 . Table 5 Seaton and Buchanan inquiry was obviously a significant factor in accounting for this. In 1860-62 the public IVR for London stood at 417 per 1,000 live births, rising to 517 per 1,000 during the epidemic period 1862-63 (see Table 3 above).91 Table 5 Table 6 -which calculates from the VO returns the level of total vaccination rates (i.e. both public and private vaccination) for the period 1872 to 1890-provides an additional angle to the one displayed in Table 5 . The IVR level in London remains below the national figure throughout, but the pattern over the capital is still a complex one. Some of the poorest parts of London-Poplar, Whitechapel, St Olave Southwark-returned a rather impressive degree of vaccination coverage on a fairly consistent basis. Comparing the figures for public vaccinations in 1871 in Table 5 with those for total vaccinations in 1872 in Table 6 , it is impossible to gauge whether the implementation of the 1871 Vaccination Acts had any significant impact upon the level of public vaccination locally, although Table 4 above was highly suggestive on this point. Doubtless the figures in Table 6 represent a fair amount of "topping up" of public vaccination by private operations which were considered inefficient, as we have already seen. The Medical Department at the LGB was also interested in eliminating the residual 10 per cent or so of "missing" infant vaccinations in London. Initial confidence expressed by Seaton in the early 1870s that this percentage would lessen when some lax unions eventually appointed VOs, and once the proficiency of the existing VOs had been heightened, was not convincingly borne out by the evidence of subsequent years.94 It was believed that the obstacle to complete vaccination coverage that was presented by a highly migratory population-as was the case in the poorer districts listed above-could be largely overcome by the work of a diligent VO. Yet the fact that after a birth many families regularly moved between London unions before the three months allowed for vaccination had expired, thus escaping vaccination, remained a constant concern.95 In his investigation of the 1881 epidemic, Stevens concluded that the high rates of smallpox mortality in the unvaccinated "would seem to imply (1) faults in the machinery for the provision of vaccination, or (2) defective administration of that machinery-possibly both". He was particularly struck with the 52 91 The figures are taken from, Return of the 94 E C Seaton, 'Digest of the Vaccination number of vaccinations for the year ended 29
Officers' returns, so far as received down to January September; 1870 , PP 1871 , lix, p. 505. 31st 1874 Bill containing more than 100 clauses which had been introduced so late in the Parliamentary session. A report made by the Parliamentary Committee of the MBW had interpreted the proposed new role of the LGB in the capital as "a serious step towards centralization in local government", and accordingly instructed the vestries and district boards to take immediate steps against the Bill. 102 Partly as a result of this recommendation, the vestries and district boards unanimously petitioned the House of Commons on three basic grounds: first, the LGB had only once used the powers vested in it by the 1871 Local Government Act, thus obviating the need to re-enact these powers; second, some clauses, such as the one referring to "epidemic diseases", were ambiguous in their wording and were open to differing interpretation; third, they objected to the fact that the second reading of the Bill took place before it was printed, and that they had had little opportunity to consider the full implications of the legislation.103 Vestry pleas for the Bill to be delayed were merely blocking manoeuvres to legislation which threatened their autonomy in local public health matters, especially since the proposed authority for taking away this freedom was the LGB, the attitude of which was considered by the local sanitary authorities to be, "obnoxious to nearly all those with whom they have had any official business". (Metropolis) Bill had failed to do, namely consolidate the majority of the existing sanitary laws relating to London, although executive responsibilities were somewhat arbitrarily sub-divided between the LCC and the vestries, and smallpox vaccination was ignored altogether.
Conclusion
In the mid-and late-nineteenth century, London's rates of smallpox mortality were generally higher than those of England and Wales. This paper has suggested that the main reason for this was the inefficient management and implementation of compulsory vaccination in London, rather than simply ideological objections from the general public (although the inefficiencies of the vaccination system in London would have offered the opportunity for a more concealed opposition than elsewhere in the country). This particular critique is valuable for two interrelated reasons. First, throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, information concerning the levels and trends of mortality and sickness were increasingly used as evidence to justify state intervention to improve both public and private health.123 A prime example of this is the extensive range of material concerning smallpox vaccination collected by the medical profession on behalf of the state and deployed in debates about the operation's efficacy, administration and epidemiological impact. No doubt, this can be interpreted as part of the wider "medicalization" of society. Through the epidemiological investigations of doctors such as Seaton and Buchanan, by the mid-nineteenth century, "we begin to see", in the words of Christopher Lawrence, "the creation of a new medical science of disorder, the promotion of medically informed solutions and the advancement of the claims of the medical expert. Within this science, detailed knowledge of the biology, pathology and epidemiology of disease were deemed the foundations of action". 124 Smallpox vaccination provided a perfect example of this, becoming the medical basis for an argument which advocated the administrative simplification of "sanitary" London. This leads naturally into the second feature of the critique. Because of the unique structure of its sanitary legislation and executive, London provides a particularly interesting case study from an administrative-bureaucratic viewpoint. The lack of central control over all the preventive legislation in the capital, and the failure to introduce consolidating measures, meant that in most sanitary matters essentially local problems were dealt with by locally developed solutions. While the want of administrative unification primarily underlay the poor performance of vaccination in London in the 1850s and 1860s, it should also be emphasized that the most undermining aspect was the inextricable link of vaccination with the Poor Law authorities. This relationship struck far deeper than the inefficiency typified by spatial sub-division at the parochial level (the vaccination station problem being the most glaring example); or of the fearful public perception surrounding the stigma of association with the Poor Law, which not only caused evasion, but also led to higher levels of (largely inefficiently-performed) private vaccination in London, where there was a greater concentration of wealth than elsewhere in the country. Most significantly, because vaccination was the sole preserve of the already highly-centralized Poor Law administration, the arguments put forward for the overhaul of the service failed to influence the wider political debate concerning the consolidation of London's government. With the vestries and the City Corporation persuasively lobbying central government against rationalization, most public health responsibilities remained entirely in the hands of the metropolitan MOHs. It is arguable that in the absence of a centralized sanitary authority or legislation, smallpox would probably have proved less of a threat to the life of Londoners had the vaccination service also been under their jurisdiction.
124 C Lawrence, Medicine in the making of modem Britain, 1700 -1920 , London, Routledge, 1994 
